Looking at the World
US casualties in Iraq surpass 1,800 today and edge closer and closer to a dangerous and disappointing 2,000. There were two separate attacks claiming 7 marines total today. Our hearts are with their families.
And the Christian Science Monitor writes up a two-day report card breaking down, in very simple to understand analysis, the current shape of Al Queda-style global terrorism. These pieces are fascinating and a must-read- they attempt to break down the history of the current jihad; the growth in Western countries; and the future goals and intentions of the movements.
Part 1:
How Radical Islamists See the World
Part 2:
Jihad: Who's Joining, and Why?
And important element to Al Queda's strategy in their jihad is the idea of a caliphate; a fundamentalist Islamic geographical country. The caliphate they desire would act as a geographic base to spread Islam across the globe.
There is some contemporary thoughts that suggest that, in the past, potential caliphates would include Somalia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Indonesia; and that current candidates might include Ethiopia, Egypt and even Saudi Arabia, depending on the circumstances that bring appropriate change. The idea of a caliphate is an integral aspect to bin Laden's stated needs: he has stated that eventually Al Queda would need to take over a country in order to continue its mission and growth.
Not that I have any authority at all in this subject matter, but the caliphate is also the point where Al Queda's ends seem to fall apart. By far the easiest nations to overthrow and turn into a fundamentalist Islamic state are the most economically poor and isolated. And as the Taleban have shown, turning Afghanistan into a fundamentalist hotbed makes it difficult to maintain a government- particularly when it is discovered that the most use anybody's gotten out of the government is the ability to set up terrorist training camps. Very few Western nations will stand by and allow that.
On the other hand, taking over a relatively wealthy nation, like Egypt or another nation and turning it into an Islamofascist aggressor will prove to be difficult as well. Diverting any significant amount of federal wealth into a breeding pond for terrorism, in today's environment, will be dangerous in many ways. International action and economic sanctions will cripple these countries, plunging them into economic ruin. If your only exportable industry is terrorism, your trade agreements with other countries will be minimal.
So it's in these wealthier nations' greater interests to resist organized terror, and resist the prospect of the caliphate [as has been done in Pakistan, for instance].
Thus, we have this fractured, discordant, spastic version of jihadism. As the articles state, Al Queda is more of an idea than an organization.
And so finding ways to counteract that idea become very important in order to reduce the poignancy of terroristic attacks.
And the Christian Science Monitor writes up a two-day report card breaking down, in very simple to understand analysis, the current shape of Al Queda-style global terrorism. These pieces are fascinating and a must-read- they attempt to break down the history of the current jihad; the growth in Western countries; and the future goals and intentions of the movements.
Part 1:
How Radical Islamists See the World
Part 2:
Jihad: Who's Joining, and Why?
And important element to Al Queda's strategy in their jihad is the idea of a caliphate; a fundamentalist Islamic geographical country. The caliphate they desire would act as a geographic base to spread Islam across the globe.
There is some contemporary thoughts that suggest that, in the past, potential caliphates would include Somalia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Indonesia; and that current candidates might include Ethiopia, Egypt and even Saudi Arabia, depending on the circumstances that bring appropriate change. The idea of a caliphate is an integral aspect to bin Laden's stated needs: he has stated that eventually Al Queda would need to take over a country in order to continue its mission and growth.
Not that I have any authority at all in this subject matter, but the caliphate is also the point where Al Queda's ends seem to fall apart. By far the easiest nations to overthrow and turn into a fundamentalist Islamic state are the most economically poor and isolated. And as the Taleban have shown, turning Afghanistan into a fundamentalist hotbed makes it difficult to maintain a government- particularly when it is discovered that the most use anybody's gotten out of the government is the ability to set up terrorist training camps. Very few Western nations will stand by and allow that.
On the other hand, taking over a relatively wealthy nation, like Egypt or another nation and turning it into an Islamofascist aggressor will prove to be difficult as well. Diverting any significant amount of federal wealth into a breeding pond for terrorism, in today's environment, will be dangerous in many ways. International action and economic sanctions will cripple these countries, plunging them into economic ruin. If your only exportable industry is terrorism, your trade agreements with other countries will be minimal.
So it's in these wealthier nations' greater interests to resist organized terror, and resist the prospect of the caliphate [as has been done in Pakistan, for instance].
Thus, we have this fractured, discordant, spastic version of jihadism. As the articles state, Al Queda is more of an idea than an organization.
And so finding ways to counteract that idea become very important in order to reduce the poignancy of terroristic attacks.
posted by General Stan at 3:57 PM
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