Gen. Clark and Iraq

Armando over at dKos has an excellent breakdown of Gen. Wesley Clark's sharp and pointed criticism of the handling of the war in Iraq from Invasion through restructuring:

Unfortunately, the administration didn't see the need for a diplomatic track, and its scattershot diplomacy in the region -- threats, grandiose pronouncements and truncated communications -- has been ill-advised and counterproductive. The U.S. diplomatic failure has magnified the difficulties facing the political and military elements of strategy by contributing to the increasing infiltration of jihadists and the surprising resiliency of the insurgency.

On the political track, aiming for a legitimate, democratic Iraqi government was essential, but the United States was far too slow in mobilizing Iraqi political action. A wasted first year encouraged a rise in sectarian militias and the emergence of strong fractionating forces. Months went by without a U.S. ambassador in Iraq, and today political development among the Iraqis is hampered by the lack not only of security but also of a stable infrastructure program that can reliably deliver gas, electricity and jobs.

Meanwhile, on the military track, security on the ground remains poor at best. U.S. armed forces still haven't received resources, restructuring and guidance adequate for the magnitude of the task. Only in June, over two years into the mission of training Iraqi forces, did the president announce such "new steps" as partnering with Iraqi units, establishing "transition teams" to work with Iraqi units and training Iraqi ministries to conduct antiterrorist operations. But there is nothing new about any of this; it is the same nation-building doctrine that we used in Vietnam. Where are the thousands of trained linguists? Where are the flexible, well-resourced, military-led infrastructure development programs to win "hearts and minds?" Where are the smart operations and adequate numbers of forces -- U.S., coalition or Iraqi -- to strengthen control over the borders?

With each passing month the difficulties are compounded and the chances for a successful outcome are reduced. Urgent modification of the strategy is required before it is too late to do anything other than simply withdraw our forces.

Armando's read of Gen. Clark's thoughts:

So the onus is on Bush. If he does not do what Clark (and other Dems hopefully) say, then Bush will lose Iraq and be forced to cut and run. Excellent. This, in my opinion, should have been the lead paragraph. In fact, he should have junked the lead paragraph. The column should have been that Bush has placed us on the brink in Iraq leaving us thisclose from having no options but to withdraw.

Clark follows with some policy wonkery that Bush is never gonna do and finishes with this flourish:


"The growing chorus of voices demanding a pullout should seriously alarm the Bush administration, because President Bush and his team are repeating the failure of Vietnam: failing to craft a realistic and effective policy and instead simply demanding that the American people show resolve. Resolve isn't enough to mend a flawed approach -- or to save the lives of our troops. If the administration won't adopt a winning strategy, then the American people will be justified in demanding that it bring our troops home."

There you go General. Bush is losing Iraq and will lose Iraq and have to "cut and run" unless he adopts our winning proposals (which he of course will never do).
Ok. I am sold. Lose the first paragraph, and we can adopt this as our Democratic manifesto on Iraq now. That would be good politics and can lead to good policy after we win the 2006 elections.

In my opinion of course.

Gen. Clark does have an additional responsibility with these thoughts, and Armando slightly dismisses them: He must communicate this as something of a Democratic talking point; these ideas need to be adopted by the Democratic leadership as an opposition doctrine on Iraq.