The Liberal Hawk
Jaron Larnier has an interesting [long] post over at the HuffPo entitled "The agony of a liberal hawk," discussing his particular current predicament having been a pro-Invasion liberal under Bush. Larnier expends great energy trying to placate anti-war critics, and it seems almost excessive, though necessary, I'm sure. The fact is, he has a couple points that should be discussed and critiqued, not condemned. Anyway. From the center of his piece:
Larnier makes two interesting points: the first being the issue of governmental trust with Colin Powell's presentation to the UN. Indeed, this presentation was one of many moments "key" to the American perception, and helped America to be sold on the need for the Invasion.
It is also one of the many moments that I found myself further and further from joining the calls for war. If, under the absolute best circumstances, Powell had changed the gravity within the Security Council and left not only with an enforcement Resolution [this was his goal], but with statements of support, materially and philosophically, to the Invasion, then things may have been different. If Powell left the building with Kofi Annan's dismayed approval that war was necessary, I might have been convinced.
But through the buildup to the war, the Coalition of the Willing never materialized beyond a propaganda piece. I could never accept this: the US was failing to convince the world that the world's greatest problem was terrorism brought by Saddam Hussein; and it failed then to convince me. This is not to deride Mr. Larnier's perspective, but only to offer that it seems as though his aims had clouded this perspective from entering into his own decision-making process. The fact is- nobody else accepted this war as being legitimate or justified; the fact that "we" did tells us plenty about the information gap and the lack of an internal American discussion on the matter. In addition to the utter lack of evidence linking Saddam to 9/11 and Bush's questionable timing in demanding a war on Iraq, and I felt the evidence was all too clear that this was unacceptable demands for an Invasion, and so did the rest of the world.
The second, and vitally interesting point that Larnier expresses is his view that the war's greater intention would be to act as a retributive moral benefit for the region following various wrongs of the west there. It's better than leaving it to stew in its own terrible corruption.
I think that he's right. That the fact that the west has been so ignorant and disengaged from the Middle East has only aided the entrenchment of many terrible powers, and that the west is responsible for this to a great degree [just as it has done with Africa].
But Larnier's argument was never part of the debate with Iraq in the official capacity. Indeed, if the moral good argument were crafted and presented, I think it would have enhanced a certain degree of support- particularly if it was justified. The reason the Moral Argument was never appropriately brokered in the Invasion is because you can't simply say that Invading Iraq and bringing democracy there will fix any of these ills. America would then be held responsible for approaching every experience of immoral systematic action that oppressed the Middle East and benefitted the west.
Do you see where I'm getting? If Larnier follows this moral argument for one Invasion, it becomes massive, expensive, and thoroghly complicated very quickly. No longer could America prop up the Saudi Royal Family. No longer could we support fictitious national borders which isolated or divided entire cultural groups such as the Kurds. While the moral approah is the Right one, it takes no effort whatsoever to discover that Larnier's morals will never coexist with Bush's Administration and their deeply interested [economically, politically] factions in keeping the Middle East just as it is. Oil is the moral of choice.
So again, it seems Larnier was not, as he says, "cynical" enough at the time; but this isn't solely cynicism at work. The fact is, Larnier supported the war for a moral reason which the Administration did not support. This should be part of the debate for all of us. In fact, when any group of people truly develop moral ascendency in the model that Larnier discusses- extending actual justice to the Middle East and Africa - you know what? Count me in.
Problem is, justice doesn't have anything to do with war...
Just FYI- Larnier's piece is much longer than what I've discussed with many interesting, thoughtful insights. Please check it out. I just wanted to examine some of the reasons we culturally supported the war when it was against our own moral perceptions, and Larnier's piece inspired a couple examples of this. And Larnier exhibits a great courage- indeed the same courage I feel the anti-war left exhibited at the time- which is one that seeks to burst the debate on ethical and moral reasons for war wide open, to actually engage different perceptions. Many kudos.
Here are some of the reasons why I supported the Iraq invasion, but with a very heavy heart.Now, there is no way to verify that the AntiC has been anti-war since well before the war occurred [the AntiC is still in its infancy, and so no record can exist other than the posters' assurances that they were "anti-war before it was cool"] so we're not going to engage in that "I told you so" debate.
One reason, which proved to be mistaken, is that I trusted Colin Powell and some other public figures on matters of fact. Plamegate has taught me I should have been more cynical. I resent having to be cynical. No leader should demand cynicism from citizens. But even leaving aside the official justifications that turned out to be false, I had other reasons to support military intervention.
Broadly speaking, the Western industrial countries were partially to blame for the troubles in much of the Middle East. Not only were many of the awkward national borders the result of imposed colonial policies, but some of the worst figures of recent times, including Saddam and bin Laden, had received American support. Furthermore, our allies, the British, had lied to the Israelis and Arabs during Israel’s formation in ways that were convenient to the moment, but fostered long term enmity.
A common Western Left perspective on our past sins is that we ought to now just leave the Middle East alone. My perspective is that in theory that might sound attractive, but in practice it would be even more cruel. Some of the worst creeps, like Saddam, were so entrenched, by means of the most awful, sadistic, and murderous forms of mass blackmail, that the only plausible way to get rid of them in the near term was physical intervention. I interpret our shameful legacy as placing a moral responsibility on us to try to improve the situation.
The reason we should help is not only that we share blame for the problem, and certainly not that we’re better than anyone else, but that at this moment in world history we happen to be able to help in ways that others cannot. This reasoning is linked to arguments I agree with for why we should have sacrificed more and taken risks to prevent recent genocides in parts of Africa. Bush’s profound failure as a leader and communicator (who famously bragged that he was on a “Crusade”) has obscured the fact that with a better leader, the Iraq war might have been undertaken cooperatively with much of the world, including even the Arab and Muslim worlds, as was the case with the earlier eviction of Saddam from Kuwait.
Bush gave many early warning signs that he wasn’t the best man for the job, but it wasn’t yet clear at the beginning that he was almost the worst imaginable man for the job. Remember, his father had shown evidence of an ascendant moral compass, in that, for instance, the intervention in Somalia, while half-hearted and failed, did not seem to serve any strong American interest other than to promote peace and justice. I thought that surely the son couldn’t be as out of touch as he sometimes seemed.
Another point must be made, which is that the professional/volunteer American military is populated for the most part by remarkably good people these days, and I imagined them doing a great job in connecting with ordinary Iraqis. My impression comes from meeting a lot of military people via technology circles. The insurgency seems to agree, because it has prioritized preventing contact between ordinary Iraqis and Americans, by blowing up Iraqi children around an American soldier handing out candy, for instance. (One of the sadder elements of the war at home is that President Bush has placed the entire burden on our volunteer warriors and their families. He asks no one else to sacrifice or even spend a penny in the present moment, because he so fears he will not be loved anymore.)
Tragically, Bush has proven to be the Great Anti-communicator. He can only speak to his own political base, using language internal to the American culture wars, which is unintelligible to outsiders. He is unable to speak to anyone else at all.
Larnier makes two interesting points: the first being the issue of governmental trust with Colin Powell's presentation to the UN. Indeed, this presentation was one of many moments "key" to the American perception, and helped America to be sold on the need for the Invasion.
It is also one of the many moments that I found myself further and further from joining the calls for war. If, under the absolute best circumstances, Powell had changed the gravity within the Security Council and left not only with an enforcement Resolution [this was his goal], but with statements of support, materially and philosophically, to the Invasion, then things may have been different. If Powell left the building with Kofi Annan's dismayed approval that war was necessary, I might have been convinced.
But through the buildup to the war, the Coalition of the Willing never materialized beyond a propaganda piece. I could never accept this: the US was failing to convince the world that the world's greatest problem was terrorism brought by Saddam Hussein; and it failed then to convince me. This is not to deride Mr. Larnier's perspective, but only to offer that it seems as though his aims had clouded this perspective from entering into his own decision-making process. The fact is- nobody else accepted this war as being legitimate or justified; the fact that "we" did tells us plenty about the information gap and the lack of an internal American discussion on the matter. In addition to the utter lack of evidence linking Saddam to 9/11 and Bush's questionable timing in demanding a war on Iraq, and I felt the evidence was all too clear that this was unacceptable demands for an Invasion, and so did the rest of the world.
The second, and vitally interesting point that Larnier expresses is his view that the war's greater intention would be to act as a retributive moral benefit for the region following various wrongs of the west there. It's better than leaving it to stew in its own terrible corruption.
I think that he's right. That the fact that the west has been so ignorant and disengaged from the Middle East has only aided the entrenchment of many terrible powers, and that the west is responsible for this to a great degree [just as it has done with Africa].
But Larnier's argument was never part of the debate with Iraq in the official capacity. Indeed, if the moral good argument were crafted and presented, I think it would have enhanced a certain degree of support- particularly if it was justified. The reason the Moral Argument was never appropriately brokered in the Invasion is because you can't simply say that Invading Iraq and bringing democracy there will fix any of these ills. America would then be held responsible for approaching every experience of immoral systematic action that oppressed the Middle East and benefitted the west.
Do you see where I'm getting? If Larnier follows this moral argument for one Invasion, it becomes massive, expensive, and thoroghly complicated very quickly. No longer could America prop up the Saudi Royal Family. No longer could we support fictitious national borders which isolated or divided entire cultural groups such as the Kurds. While the moral approah is the Right one, it takes no effort whatsoever to discover that Larnier's morals will never coexist with Bush's Administration and their deeply interested [economically, politically] factions in keeping the Middle East just as it is. Oil is the moral of choice.
So again, it seems Larnier was not, as he says, "cynical" enough at the time; but this isn't solely cynicism at work. The fact is, Larnier supported the war for a moral reason which the Administration did not support. This should be part of the debate for all of us. In fact, when any group of people truly develop moral ascendency in the model that Larnier discusses- extending actual justice to the Middle East and Africa - you know what? Count me in.
Problem is, justice doesn't have anything to do with war...
Just FYI- Larnier's piece is much longer than what I've discussed with many interesting, thoughtful insights. Please check it out. I just wanted to examine some of the reasons we culturally supported the war when it was against our own moral perceptions, and Larnier's piece inspired a couple examples of this. And Larnier exhibits a great courage- indeed the same courage I feel the anti-war left exhibited at the time- which is one that seeks to burst the debate on ethical and moral reasons for war wide open, to actually engage different perceptions. Many kudos.
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